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Abstract
Cloud computing oers the economies of scale for computa-
tional resources with the ease of management, elasticity, and
fault tolerance. To take advantage of these benets, many
enterprises are contemplating to outsource the middlebox
processing services in the cloud. However, middleboxes that
process condential and private data cannot be securely de-
ployed in the untrusted environment of the (edge) cloud.
To securely outsource middleboxes to the cloud, the state-
of-the-art systems advocate network processing over the
encrypted trac. Unfortunately, these systems support only
restrictive middlebox functionalities, and incur prohibitively
high overheads due to the complex computations involved
over the encrypted trac.
is motivated the design of Slick—a secure middlebox
framework for deploying high-performance Network Func-
tions (NFs) on untrusted commodity servers. Slick exposes
a generic interface based on Click to design and implement
a wide-range of NFs using its out-of-the box elements and
C++ extensions. Slick leverages Scone (a shielded execu-
tion framework based on Intel SGX) and Intel DPDK to
securely process condential data at line rate.
More specically, Slick provides hardware-assisted mem-
ory protection, and conguration and aestation service for
seamless and veriable deployment of middleboxes. We have
also added several new features for commonly required func-
tionalities: new specialized Click elements for secure packet
processing, secure shared memory packet transfer for NFs
chaining, secure state persistence, an ecient on-NIC timer
for SGX enclaves, and memory safety against DPDK-specic
Iago aacks. Furthermore, we have implemented several
SGX-specic optimizations in Slick. Our evaluation shows
that Slick achieves near-native throughput and latency.
1 Introduction
Modern enterprises ubiquitously deploy network appliances
or “middleboxes” to manage their networking infrastruc-
ture. ese middleboxes manage a wide-range of workows
for improving the eciency (e.g., WAN optimizers), perfor-
mance (e.g., caching, proxies), reliability (e.g., load balancers
and monitoring), and security (e.g., rewalls and intrusion
detection systems). Due to their wide-spread usage in the
networking infrastructure, these middleboxes incur signi-
cant deployment, maintenance, and management costs [42].
To overcome these limitations, many enterprises are con-
templating to outsource the middlebox processing services
in the cloud [31, 42]. Cloud computing oers the economies
of scale for computational resources with the ease of manage-
ment, elasticity, and fault tolerance. e realization of vision:
“middleboxes as a service in the cloud” is strengthened by the
advancements in soware-dened middleboxes, also known
as Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [29]. Network
Function Virtualization oers a exible andmodular architec-
ture that can be easily deployed on the commodity hardware.
us, NFV is a perfect candidate to reap the outsourcing
benets of the (edge) cloud computing infrastructure.
However, middleboxes that process condential and pri-
vate data cannot be securely deployed in the untrusted en-
vironment of the cloud. In the cloud environment, an ac-
cidental or, in some cases, intentional action from a cloud
administrator could compromise the condentiality and in-
tegrity of execution. ese threats of potential violations to
the integrity and condentiality of customer data is oen
cited as a key barrier to the adoption of cloud services [36].
To securely outsource middleboxes to the cloud, the state-
of-the-art systems advocate network processing over the
encrypted trac [25, 43]. However, these systems support
only restrictive type of middlebox functionalities, and incur
prohibitively high performance overheads since they require
complex computations over the encrypted network trac.
ese limitations motivated our work—we strive to an-
swer the following question: How to securely outsource the
middlebox processing service on the untrusted third-party plat-
form without sacricing performance while supporting a wide
range of enterprise NFs?
To answer this question, we propose Slick—a secure mid-
dlebox framework for deploying high-performance Network
Functions (NFs) on untrusted commodity servers. e ar-
chitecture of Slick is based on four design principles: (1)
Security — we aim to provide strong condentiality and in-
tegrity guarantees for the execution of middleboxes against
a powerful adversary, (2) Performance — we strive to achieve
near-native throughput and latency, (3) Generality — we aim
to support a wide range of network functions (same as plain-
text processing) with the ease of programmability, and, (4)
Transparency — we aim to provide a transparent, portable,
and veriable environment for deploying middleboxes.
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Slick leverages Click [23] to provide a exible and mod-
ular framework to build a rich set of NFs using its out-
of-the box elements and C++ extensions. Slick leverages
hardware-assisted secure enclaves based on Intel SGX to
provide strong condentiality and integrity properties [14].
To achieve high performance despite the inherent limita-
tions of the SGX architecture, Slick builds on Scone [35]
(a shielded execution framework) and Intel DPDK [2] to
eciently process packets in the userspace secure enclave
memory. Finally, Slick builds on the container technology
with a remote aestation interface [32] to provide a portable
deployment and cryptographic veriable mechanism.
Using the Slick framework, themiddlebox owner launches
a Slick instance in the cloud and performs remote aestation,
passing Slick an encrypted conguration in case of success-
ful aestation. ereaer, Slick executes user-dened Click
elements, which are responsible for reading packets in the
userspace directly from NIC, performing network trac pro-
cessing, and sending them back to the network. All elements
run inside SGX enclave. Packets that must be processed un-
der SGX protection are copied into the enclave explicitly. We
eciently execute the expensive network I/O operations (to-
and-from the enclave memory) by integrating Scone with
DPDK.
Furthermore, we have designed several new design fea-
tures for commonly required middlebox functionalities: (a) a
remote aestation and conguration service for a seamless
and veriable deployment of middleboxes in the cloud, (b)
new Click elements for secure packet processing, (c) an e-
cient and secure shared memory packet transfer in the mul-
tiple SGX enclaves setup for NFVs chaining [20], (d) a secure
state persistence layer for fault-tolerance/migration [41], (e)
an on-NIC PTP clock as the time source for the SGX enclaves,
and (f) a memory protection mechanism to defend against
DPDK-specic Iago aacks [13].
We have implemented the aforementioned security fea-
tures, and also added several SGX-specic performance opti-
mizations to Slick. Lastly, we have evaluated the system us-
ing a series of microbenchmarks, and two case-studies: a mul-
tiport IP Router, and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Our
evaluation shows that Slick achieves near-native through-
put and latency. In order to improve throughput, we limit
memory copying by storing most of the packets outside the
enclave, using more ecient data structures and preallocat-
ing memory. In order to reduce latency, we use NIC timer
when necessary, and avoid unnecessary system calls by mod-
ifying Click timer event scheduler.
2 Background
In this section, we present a brief necessary background
about the three technical building blocks of Slick: shielded
execution, DPDK, and Click.
2.1 Shielded Execution
Shielded execution provides strong condentiality and in-
tegrity guarantees for unmodied legacy applications run-
ning on untrusted platforms. Ourwork builds on Scone [35]—
a shielded execution framework based on Intel SGX [14].
Intel Soware Guard Extensions (SGX). Intel SGX is a
set of ISA extensions for Trusted Execution Environments
(TEE) released as part of the Skylake architecture. Intel
SGX provides an abstraction of secure enclave—a memory
region for which the CPU guarantees the condentiality and
integrity of the data and code residing in it. More specically,
the enclave memory is located in the Enclave Page Cache
(EPC)—a dedicated memory region protected by MEE, an
on-chip Memory Encryption Engine. e MEE encrypts and
decrypts cache lines with writes and reads in the EPC, respec-
tively. e processor veries that the read/write accesses to
the EPC are originated from the enclave code. Furthermore,
the MEE veries the integrity of the accessed page to detect
memory modications and rollback aacks.
However, the architecture of SGX suers from two major
limitations: First, the EPC is a limited resource, currently
restricted to 128 MB (out of which only 94 MB is available
to all enclaves). To overcome this limitation, SGX supports a
secure paging mechanism to an unprotected memory. How-
ever, the paging mechanism incurs very high overheads de-
pending on thememory access paern (2× to 2000×). Second,
the execution of system calls is prohibited inside the enclave.
To execute a system call, the executing thread has to exit
the enclave. e system call arguments need to be copied
in and out of the enclave memory. Such enclave transitions
are expensive—especially, in the context of middleboxes—
because of security checks and TLB ushes.
SCONE. SCONE is a shielded execution framework for un-
modied applications based on Intel SGX [35]. In the SCONE
framework, the legacy applications are statically compiled
and linked against a modied standard C library (SCONE
libc). In this model, application’s address space is conned to
the enclave memory, and interaction with the outside world
(or the untrusted memory) is performed only via the system
call interface. e SCONE libc executes system calls out-
side the enclave on behalf of the shielded application. e
SCONE framework protects the executing application from
the outside world, such as untrusted OS, through shields.
In particular, shields copy arguments of system calls inside
and outside the enclave and provide functionality to trans-
parently encrypt the data that leaves the enclave perimeter.
Furthermore, SCONE provides a user-level threading mech-
anism inside the enclave combined with the asynchronous
system call mechanism in which threads outside the enclave
asynchronously execute the system calls [45] without forcing
the enclave threads to exit the enclave.
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2.2 Intel DPDK and Click
Intel DPDK.We build on the Intel DPDK library [2] that
supports developing high-performance networked systems
running on commodity hardware. e DPDK library allows
processing of L2 packets from NIC directly in the userspace;
thus it completely bypasses the OS networking stack to im-
prove both the throughput and latency.
e DPDK library consists of three main components: En-
vironment Abstraction Layer (EAL), memory management
subsystem, and Poll Mode Drivers (PMD). EAL provides
a unied way to initialize the central DPDK components
(memory management, poll drivers, threading, etc.). e
memory management unit of DPDK utilizes huge pages for
the buer management through its own memory allocator
(mempool). e mbuf library provides functionality to store
and process the raw packet data (which is directly mapped
in the userspace virtual memory) in the memory blocks al-
located from a mempool. Lastly, a PMD uses the memory
rings on the NIC to directly send and receive packets without
interrupts, thus achieving high CPU utilization.
Click. In addition to DPDK, we leverage Click’s [23] pro-
grammable and extensible architecture for the implementa-
tion of NFs using its out-of-the-box elements and C++ exten-
sions. In particular, Click provides a dataow programming
language that allows construction of middleboxes as a graph
of elements—small, reusable, atomic pieces of network trac
processing functionality. ereaer, Click routes packets
through the elements in the dataow graph. e modular
architecture of Click greatly improves the programmability,
productivity, and dependability of middleboxes.
3 Overview
Basic design. At a high-level, the core of our system Slick
consists of a simple integration of a DPDK-enabled Click
that is running inside the SGX enclave using Scone. Figure 1
shows the high-level architecture of Slick.
While designing Slick, we need to take into account the ar-
chitectural limitations of Intel SGX. As described in §2.1, an
enclave context switch (or exiting the enclave synchronously
for issuing system calls) is quite expensive in the SGX ar-
chitecture. e Scone framework overcomes this limitation
using an asynchronous system call mechanism [45]. While
the asynchronous mechanism is good enough for commonly
used services like HTTP servers or KV stores—it can not
sustain the trac rates of modern middleboxes. erefore,
we decided to use the userspace DPDK I/O library as a beer
t for the SGX enclaves to achieve high performance.
Furthermore, we need to ensure that the memory footprint
of Slick code and data is minimal, due to several reasons:
As described in §2.1, enclaves that use more than 94MB of
physical memory suer high performance penalties due to
EPC paging (2× to 2000×). In fact, to process data packets
Inside SGX enclave
Userspace
Kernel and 
SGX driver 
Click
SCONE runtime
DPDK
NIC
Rx Tx
Figure 1: Slick basic design
at line rate, even stricter resource limit must be obeyed—the
working set of the application must t into the L3 cache.
erefore, our design diligently ensures that we incur min-
imum cache misses, and avoid EPC paging.
Besides performance reasons, minimizing the code size
inside the enclave leads to a smaller Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) and allows to reduce the aack surface. e core
of Click is already quite small (6MB for a statically linked
binary section that is loaded in the memory). We decrease its
size by removing the unnecessaryClick elements at the build
time. Importantly, we designed Slickwith the packet-related
DPDK data structures running outside of the enclave.
More specically, when the Scone runtime starts the appli-
cation, it automatically places the application code, statically
allocated data, and heap in the SGX-protected memory. is
mechanism is in contrast the way DPDK operates—it by de-
fault allocates memory using x86 64 huge page mechanism,
which reduces the TLB miss rate. Such pages are not sup-
ported inside the enclave; besides that, NIC can only deliver
packets to the unprotected memory, and network trac en-
tering or leaving machine can be modied by aacker. ere-
fore, we keep the huge pages enabled in DPDK outside the
enclave, and explicitly copy packets that must be processed
with SGX protection into the enclave. With this scheme,
DPDK-created packet data structures are allocated outside
the SGX enclave. We support an ecient data transfer be-
tween the DPDK and enclave and processing inside the en-
clave using the new secure Click elements (detailed in §4.2).
When Slick starts, it performs remote aestation and
obtains the conguration. Slick initializes the DPDK sub-
systems, allocates huge page memory and takes the control
over NICs that are available. en, it starts running Click
element scheduler, which reads packets from the NIC and
passes them along the processing chain until they leave the
system or are dropped. Packets that need SGX protection
are explicitly copied into enclave.
reatmodel. We target a scenario where the middleboxes
that process condential and sensitive data are deployed in
the untrusted cloud environment (or at the edge computing
nodes at ISPs) [42]. Although the cloud providers are usually
contractually obligated to not interfere with the compute
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and storage units, an accidental leakage, or even a malicious
cloud operator might compromise the condentiality and
integrity of the execution [36]. In the context of middle-
boxes [25, 43], aackers might try to learn the contents of
the encrypted data packets and conguration of the system
such as cryptographic keys, ltering and classication rules,
etc. Furthermore, aackers might try to compromise the
integrity of a middlebox by subverting its execution.
To circumvent such aacks, we protect against a very
powerful adversary even in the presence of complex layers
of soware in the virtualized cloud computing infrastructure.
More specically, we assume that the adversary can control
the entire system soware stack, including the OS or the
hypervisor, and is able to launch physical aacks, such as
performing memory probes.
However, we note that Slick is not designed to protect
against side-channel aacks [48], such as exploiting timing
and page fault information. Furthermore, since the under-
lying infrastructure is controlled by the cloud operator we
cannot defend against the denial-of-service aacks.
System workow. Figure 2 shows the system workow
of Slick. As a preparation to the deployment, developers
build middlebox container images, and upload them to an
image repository (such as Docker Hub [1]) using the Slick
toolchain. Network operator, on the other hand, must boot-
strap a Conguration and Aestation Service (CAS) on a
trusted host, and a Local Aestation Service (LAS) on the
host that will be running the middlebox. Aer this, Slick
can be installed on the target machine in the cloud using
the container technology—either manually or deployed as a
container image from the image repository. Alternatively, it
can be installed by transferring a single binary to the target
machine.
e Slick framework is bootstrapped using the Congura-
tion and Remote Aestation Service (CAS). e CAS service
is launched either inside an SGX enclave of a (already boot-
strapped) untrusted machine in the cloud or on a trusted
machine under the control of the middlebox operator out-
side the cloud. Middlebox developers implement the neces-
sary NFs as Click congurations and send them to the CAS
service together with all necessary secrets.
Once the operator launched Slick in the cloud, it will con-
nect to CAS and carry out the remote aestation (detailed
in §4.1). If the remote aestation is successful, the Slick
instance receives the conguration and necessary secrets.
Aer that, Slick can start processing the network trac,
with all the benets:
• Security: Slick provides strong condentiality and
integrity for the middlebox execution. We leverage
hardware-assisted SGX memory enclaves to provide
strong security properties.
Configuration and 
Attestation Service 
(CAS)
Middlebox 
developer
Slick runtime & LAS
Middlebox 
image repository
(e.g. Docker Hub)
Network 
operator
Step #1
Workflow steps:
#1: Build and host middlebox images using the Slick toolchain
#2: Launch the CAS service on a trusted host
#3: Install the LAS service on a Slick host
#4: Install a Slick middlebox from the repository
#5: Provide Slick configuration and secrets to CAS
#6: Perform remote attestation, configuration, and launch Slick
Steps #2, #5 Step #6
Steps #3, #6
Step #4
Figure 2: Slick systemworkow
• Performance: Slick achieves near-native through-
put and latency by building a high-performance net-
working I/O architecture for the shielded execution
of middleboxes. We overcome the architectural lim-
itations of Intel SGX enclaves by optimizing the
combination of Scone and DPDK.
• Generality: Slick supports a wide-range of NFVs,
same as supported in the plain-text network pro-
cessing, without restricting any functionalities. We
leverage Click to provide a general framework to
implement a wide-range of NFs.
• Transparency: Lastly, Slick provides network op-
erators a portable, congurable, and veriable archi-
tecture for the middlebox deployment in cloud. We
build on the container technologywith conguration
and aestation services for a seamless deployment.
Limitation. We note that neither DPDK nor Click support
ow-based stateful trac. is implies that Slick currently
supports NFs that work on L2 and L3; as only restricted pro-
cessing of L4-L6 trac is supported. We plan to extend our
system to support ow-based trac with shielded execution
by integrating a user-level networking stack [18].
4 Design Details
We next present the design details of Slick. Figure 3 shows
the detailed architecture of Slick.
4.1 Conguration and Remote Attestation
To bootstrap a trusted middlebox system in the cloud, one
has to establish trust in the system components. While Intel
SGX provides a remote aestation feature, a holistic system
must be built for remote aestation and secure conguration
of middleboxes [37]. To achieve this goal, we have designed a
Conguration andAestation Service (CAS) formiddleboxes.
Figure 4 shows the system protocol for the CAS service.
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Figure 3: Slick detailed design
In order to aest an enclave using Intel Remote Aes-
tation, verier (operator of a Slick instance) connects to
the application and requests a quote. e enclave requests
a report from SGX hardware and transmits it to the Intel
oting Enclave (QE), which veries, signs, and sends back
the report. e enclave then forwards it to the verier. is
quote can be veried using the Intel verication service [3].
Our remote aestation system extends Intel’s RA service,
and is integrated with a conguration system, which provi-
sions Slick with its conguration in a secure way using a
trusted channel established during aestation. is system
consists of enclave-level library, Local Aestation Service
(LAS), and Conguration and Aestation Service (CAS).
• Enclave library interacts with LAS and CAS to carry
out remote aestation, and allows seing environ-
ment variables, command-line arguments, and keys
for the Scone shielding layer in a secure and con-
dential manner.
• Local Aestation Service is running on the same ma-
chine as Slick middlebox, and acts as a proxy for
interaction with the Intel Aestation Service (IAS). It
also acts as the intermediate root of trust: once LAS
is aested, further Slick instances can be launched
even when IAS is unavailable.
• Conguration Aestation Service is running on a
single (possibly replicated) node and stores cong-
uration and secrets of the services built with Scone.
It maintains information about aested enclave in-
stances, and provisions conguration to applications
using the Enclave Library.
To bootstrap the system, the operator launches CAS, either
on the host under his control or on the host in the cloud in-
side an SGX enclave. en, the CAS service is populated with
congurations and secrets using the RESTAPI or a command-
line conguration tool. LAS and IAS instances are launched
on cloud hosts that will run Slick instances. During startup,
each Slick instance establishes a TLS connection to CAS. Si-
multaneously, it connects to LAS to perform local aestation.
In the case the LAS instance is not yet aested, it will aest it-
self to CAS using Intel Remote Aestation protocol, and then
aest Slick instance to CAS using SGX local aestation. Lo-
cal aestation veries integrity of the Slick binary, and estab-
lishes whether Slick is running under SGX protection. is
allows to remove distribution mechanisms (such as Docker
Hub) from the TCB. Aer that, Slick sends the LAS quote to
CAS, and a secure channel is established between CAS and
Slick. ereaer, Slick obtains its conguration from the
CAS service and transfers control to main Slick code.
4.2 Secure Elements
As described in §3, we designed Slickwith the packet-related
data structures of DPDK running outside the enclave. ere-
fore, we needed an ecient way to support the communi-
cation between DPDK and the enclave memory region. In
particular, we have to consider the overheads of accessing the
SGX-encrypted pages from the main memory and copying
of the data between the protected and unprotected memory
regions. When possible, the data packets with plain-text
contents should not be needlessly copied into the enclave,
as it will degrade the performance. erefore, we designed
specialized secure Click elements (shown in Table 1) for
copying the data packets into/outside the enclave to facili-
tate ecient communication.
5
CAS Slick LASOperator
Populate
configuration
IAS
Slick Machine
TLS Connection
establishment
Attestation
 request
Intel
Remote Attestation
Intel Attestation Quote
for verification
Attestation reply
Attestation reply
Configuration
and secrets
Only after LAS
startup
Configuration
request
Figure 4: Slick’s conguration and attestation
By default, packets are read from NIC queues into the
untrusted memory. is reduces the overhead of using SGX
when processing packets that are not encrypted and can be
safely treated with less security mechanisms involved. Such
packets are immediately forwarded or dropped upon header
inspection. On the other hand, we must move packets into
the enclave memory with explicit copy element. We have
implemented such an element (ToEnclave), and use it to
construct secure packet processing chains.
We have also added support for the commonly used AES-
GCM cipher into Slick (Seal and Unseal elements). is
allows us to construct VPN systems that use modern crypto-
graphic mechanisms. is element was implemented using
Intel ISA-L crypto library. In order to allow secure key gen-
eration inside the enclave, we have exposed Scone functions
for geing SGXSeal keys to the Slick internal APIs.
To allow building high-performance IDS systems based
using Slick, we have created and element based on the
HyperScan regular expression library. It allows fast match-
ing of a number of regular expressions for the incoming pack-
ets, simplifying implementation of systems like Snort [5].
We have also added elements that implement more broad
mechanisms: DPDKRing (§4.3) for NFV chaining, and StateFile
(§4.4) for state persistence in middleboxes.
4.3 NFVs Chaining
Typically NFVs are chained together to build a dataow pro-
cessing graph with multiple Click elements, spanning across
multiple cores, sockets, and machines [20, 31]. e communi-
cation between dierent cores and sockets happens through
the shared memory, and communication across machines
via NICs over RDMA/Inniband. DPDK supports NUMA
systems and always explicitly tries to allocate memory from
the local socket RAM nodes.
ToEnclave
Transfers a packet to enclave, frees the original packet
Seal(Key, Security Association state)
Encrypts the packet with AES-GCM
Unseal(Key, Security Association state)
Decrypts the packet with AES-GCM
HyperScan(rule database)
High-performance regular expression matching engine
DPDKRing(Ring name)
Transfers a packet to the DPDK ring structures
StateFile(Key, path)
Provides seings to the persistent state engine
Table 1: Slick new specialized elements
However, unlike normal POSIX applications, SGX enclaves
can not be shared across dierent sockets. (e future SGX-
enabled servers might have support for the NUMA architec-
ture.) As a result, in the current Intel SGX architecture, the
users would need to run one Slick instance per each CPU
socket. Another reason for cross-instance chaining is collo-
cation of middleboxes from dierent developers that do not
necessarily trust each other. In this case, developers would
want to leverage SGX to protect the secrets. erefore, it is
imperative for the Slick framework to provide an ecient
communication mechanisms between enclaves to support
high-performance NFVs chaining.
We built an ecient mechanism for communication be-
tween dierent Slick instances by leveraging existing DPDK
features. In particular, DPDK already provides a building
block for high performance communication between dier-
ent threads or processes with its ring API. is API contains
highly optimized implementations of concurrent, lockless
FIFO queues which use huge page memory for storage. We
have implemented the DPDKRing element (see Table 1) for
Slick to utilize it for chaining. As huge page memory is
shared between multiple Slick instances, the ring buers
are shared as well and can be used as an ecient way of
communication between multiple Slick processes.
is solution requires assigning ownership of all shared
data structures to a single process. For this, we rely onDPDK
distinction between primary and secondary processes. Pri-
mary processes, the default type, request huge page memory
from the operating system, allocate memory pools and ini-
tialize the hardware. Secondary processes skip device initial-
ization and map the huge page memory already requested by
the primary process into their own address space. In order to
support NFV chaining using multiple processes on the same
machine, we added support for starting Slick instances as
secondary DPDK processes.
Depending on the process type, the DPDKRing element
either creates a new ring (primary process) or looks up an
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Seal(StateFile)
Seals elements’ state in the StateFile
Unseal(StateFile)
Unseals elements’ state from the StateFile
Persist(timer, StateFile)
Periodically persists the state to StateFile
Table 2: SlickAPIs for state persistence
existing ring (secondary process) in huge page memory. In
Slick, packets pushed towards a DPDKRing element are
enqueued into the ring and can be dequeued from the ring
in another process for further processing. A bidirectional
communication between two processes can be established
by using a pair of rings.
4.4 Middlebox State Persistence
Middleboxes oen maintain useful state (such as counter
values, Ethernet switch mapping, activity logs, routing table,
etc.) for fault-tolerance [41], migration [30], diagnostics [47],
etc. To securely persist this state, we extend Slick with new
APIs (shown in Table 2) for the state persistence in middle-
boxes. e Seal primitive is used to collect the state that
must be persisted from the elements, and write it down in
encrypted form to disk. Unseal reads this state from disk,
decrypts it and populates the elements with this state.
To congure this functionality, we have added a new con-
guration element to Slick, called StateFile (see Table 1).
Its parameters are le to which state should be wrien and
the key that should be used for encryption. Note that this
information is transmied to Slick instance in the cong-
uration string via remote aestation, and is not accessible
outside the enclave. We don’t use Scone le system shield,
and instead encrypt and decrypt le as a single block. is
ensures condentiality and integrity of stored data via the
use of AES-GCM cipher.
We do not aempt to extract the relevant state transpar-
ently. Instead, we rely on programmer providing necessary
serialization routines that save only necessary parts of el-
ement state. ese routines are available in Slick as read
and write handlers, and are triggered in the Slick startup
procedure aer the conguration is loaded, parsed, and ini-
tialization of the basic components is nished, or manually
via ControlSocket interface of the StateFile element. It’s
also possible to trigger them periodically via a timer.
4.5 NIC Time Source
Timer is one of the commonly used functionalities in middle-
boxes [29, 31]. It is used for a variety of purposes such asmea-
suring performance, scheduling execution of periodically-
triggered NFs, etc.
e timemeasurement can be ne-grained or coarse-grained
based on the application requirements. For the ne-grained
cycle-level measurements, developers use rdtscp instruc-
tion, which is extremely cheap and precise. Whereas for the
coarse-grained measurements, applications invoke system
calls like gettimeofday or clock gettime.
However, in the context SGX enclaves, both rdtsc and
system calls have unacceptable latency for their use in mid-
dleboxes to process the network trac at line rate. More
specically, the rdtscp instruction is forbidden inside the en-
clave, and therefore, it causes an enclave exit event; whereas,
asynchronous system calls in Scone are submied though a
system call queue that is optimized for the raw throughput,
but not latency.
To overcome these limitations, we have opted to use the
on-NIC PTP clock as the clock source for the enclave. is
clock can be read inside the enclave reasonably fast (0.9
µsec, which is on the same scale of magnitude as reading
HPET). Moreover, it neither causes enclave exits nor requires
submiing system calls. Furthermore, the on-NIC clock is
extremely precise since it is intended to use for the PTP
synchronization protocol.
We stress that this time source is not secure, and can be
used as a denial of service aack vector by the malicious
operation system. However, the same is true for the other
time sources—a trusted, ecient and precise time source for
SGX enclaves remains an unsolved problem that will likely
require changes to the CPU hardware [39].
4.6 DPDK-Specic Iago Attacks
Iago aacks [13] are a serious class of security aacks that
can be launched on shielded execution to compromise the
condentiality and integrity properties. In particular, an Iago
aack originates through malicious inputs supplied by the
untrusted code to the trusted code. In the classical seing, a
malicious OS can subvert the execution of an SGX-protected
application by exploiting the application’s dependency on
correct values of system call return values [11].
e decision (§3) to allocate huge pages for packet buers
and DPDK rings has security implications. e fact that
packets are passed through rings by reference, and DPDK
buers contain pointers, opens a new aack surface on Slick.
Aackers with access to this memory region could modify
pointers to point into the SGX-protected regions and make
the enclave inadvertently leak secrets over the network.
To protect against DPDK-specic Iago aacks, we have
implemented a pointer validation function. More speci-
cally, the scheme uses an enclave parameter structure that
is located inside the enclave memory and denes the en-
clave memory boundaries. Pointers are validated by check-
ing if they do not point into the enclave memory range
[base,base + enclave size). We note that Slick is already
protected against the classical syscall-specic Iago aacks
through Scone’s shielding interfaces.
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is ensures that no pointers possibly pointing to the se-
crets stored in EPC are accepted through the unprotected
huge page memory. Pointers can still be modied by a ma-
licious aacker, but they can only point to the unprotected
memory.
As it is possible for an application to enqueue and dequeue
arbitrary pointers into DPDK’s rte ring structures, it is not
easily possible to integrate this pointer check directly into
DPDK. Instead, we implemented these pointer checks in the
DPDKRing and FromDPDKDevice (§4.3) elements. If Slick de-
tects a malicious pointer, it assumes an aack, noties the
application operator and drops the packet.
5 Implementation
5.1 Toolchain
We built Slick’s toolchain using DPDK (version 16.11) and
Click (master branch commit 0e860a93). We further in-
tegrate it with the Scone runtime to compile Slick. e
toolchain is based on the musl-cross-make [4] project, mod-
ied to use Scone libc instead of the standard musl-libc.
We use gcc version 6.3.0 for the compilation process. is
enables us to use both C and C++ code. musl-cross-make
is also used to compile native version of Click for the eval-
uation. We used Boost C++ library (version 1.63) to build a
static version of the Hyperscan high performance regular ex-
pression matching engine (master branch commit 7aff6f61)
and incorporated it into Slick. We use WolfSSL library [7]
to implement the remote aestation system and StateFile
sealing, and packet Seal/Unseal elements. e toolchain
contains automated scripts for building and deploying mid-
dlebox container images, and seing up Slick and CAS ser-
vices (as described in the system workow in §3).
To make the compilation of Slick work with the Scone
toolchain, some changes to DPDK were necessary. In par-
ticular, we need to remove the helper functions for printing
stack tracebacks and provide some glibc-specic structures
and macros as well as kernel header les. Click is imple-
mented in C++ using mostly high level APIs and required no
adaptions.
e resulting Slick binary is 8.2 MB in size, and around
16 MB including minimal runtime stack and heap allocation.
is implies that we could run roughly up to six instances of
Slick in parallel on one processor without impacting the per-
formance by EPC paging (system-wide EPC limit is 94 MB).
5.2 MemoryManagement
Scone implements it’s own, in-enclave memory manage-
ment, using EPC pages for all malloc and mmap anonymous
memory allocation calls. Allocating huge page memory
through this allocator is not possible without modications.
However, accessing huge pages in DPDK does not nec-
essarily require bypassing Scone, because of the specic
way DPDK uses to allocate huge pages. Instead of passing
MAP HUGETLB ag to mmap(), it opens shared memory les in
the hugetlbfs virtual lesystem and passes those le de-
scriptors to mmap call, which is not protected by Scone. is
mmap le-to-memory mapping request is directly passed to
the operating system by Scone.
5.3 Optimizations
In order to further improve the performance, especially for
the case of DPDK running inside the enclave, we optimized
the data path inside Click. We used the Linux performance
proling tool perf [6] to nd the bolenecks.
Memory pre-allocation. e FromDPDK element allocated
memory for packet descriptor storage on the stack each time
the run task function was called. We pre-allocated this
memory once in a constructor.
Branching hints. We inserted GCC-specic unlikely /
likely macros in several if-clauses. ese get translated to
platform specic instructions which instruct the processor to
always try the given branch rst instead of using its built-in
branch prediction.
Modulo operations. We replaced all modulo operations in
the data path by compare-and-subtract operations (which
are way less expensive in terms of processing time).
eue optimization. In the ToDPDKDevice Click element
we replaced the inecient implementation of the queue
(which used std::vector from the C++ standard library)
by the rte ring structure provided by DPDK.
Timer event scheduler optimization. In the Click timer
event scheduler, we have optimized the code to reduce the
amount of clock gettime system calls. is allowed us to
reduce the latency in short element chains to the native level.
6 Evaluation
6.1 Experimental Setup
Testbed. We benchmark our system using two machines: (1)
load generator, and (2) SGX-enabled machine. e load gen-
erator is a Broadwell Intel Xeon D-1540 (2.00GHz, 8 cores, 16
hyperthreads) machine with 32 GB RAM. e SGX machine
under test is Intel Xeon E3-1270 v5 (3.60GHz, 4 cores, 8 hyper-
threads) with 32 GB RAM running Linux kernel 4.4. Each
core has private 32KB L1 and 256KB L2 caches, and all cores
share a 8MB L3 cache. e load generator is connected to the
test machine using 40 GbE Intel XL-710 network card. We
use pktgen-dpdk for throughput testing. e test machine
is congured to use the maximum number of cores. e load
generator saturates the link starting with 128 byte packets.
Applications. For the microbenchmarks, we use three ba-
sic Click elements: (1) Wire, which sends the packet im-
mediately aer receiving; (2) EtherMirror, which sends
the packet aer swapping the source and destination ad-
dresses; and (3) Firewall, which does packet ltering based
8
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Figure 6: EtherMirror throughputw/ varying packet
size
on PCAP-like rules. e Firewall element is congured
with 10 rules.
For the case-studies, we evaluated Slick using two appli-
cations: (1) a multiport IPRouter, and (2) an IDS.
Methodology. For the performance measurements, we con-
sider several cases of our system:
• Native (SGX-independent) with and without generic
optimizations.
• SGX-enabled Slick with and without optimizations.
• SGX-enabled Slick with the on-NIC timer.
6.2 roughput
We rst measure the throughput of three microbenchmark
applications with varying packet size. Slick is running on
four cores. Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 present the
throughput for Wire, Ethermirror, and Firewall, respec-
tively.
e results show that the performance of Slick matches
the performance of Click. In the case of Wire application
with the packet sizes smaller than 256 bytes, Slick is beer
than the native version. is is explained by the fact that
Click timer event scheduler optimization is missing in the
native Click, which removes some system call overhead
from the Wire application. e impact is smaller with other
applications, because they contain elements that reduce the
relative overhead of Click scheduler. We also see that Slick
achieves line rate at 512 byte packets.
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Figure 7: Firewall throughput w/ varying packet size
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Figure 8: Wire throughput w/ increasing cores
6.3 Scalability
We next consider the scalability of our system with increas-
ing number of cores. (Our latest SGX-enabled server hasmax-
imum of 4 cores / 8 HT. Recently released Intel X-Series will
consist of 18 cores.) Figure 8, Figure 9, and Figure 10 present
the throughput for Wire, Ethermirror, and Firewall, re-
spectively. e scalability of both Slick and Click is limited.
We can see that the performance for both native and Slick
peaks at four cores. ere are several reasons for this:
• DPDK and Slick work best with hyperthreading
disabled.
• Slick runs system call threads to execute system
calls asynchronously. When there are no system
calls for a long time, they back-o (i.e. yield the
CPU). ey wake up from back-o periodically, and
as result, they preempt in-enclave threads.
6.4 Latency
To evaluate the inuence of Slick’s runtime environment
on latency, we have also measured the packet processing
latency using the following scheme: load generator runs an
application, continuously generates a UDP packet and waits
for its return spinning. We study packet round trip time
measured at the load generator. On the Slick instance, we
are running the EtherMirror application. (We omit the re-
sults for other applications due to the space constraints.) For
this measurements, we did not perform any latency-specic
tuning of the environment other than thread pinning, which
is enabled by default in DPDK. We expect that a production
system with stringent requirements to low latency will use
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Figure 9: EtherMirror throughput w/ increasing
cores
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
, G
B/
s
Cores
Native
Native w/o opt.
Slick
Slick w/o opt.
Slick + NIC timer
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SCHED FIFO scheduler and have isolated cores. Figure 11
present the latency measurements for EtherMirror.
e low performance of Slick without optimizations is
explained by the fact that Slick executes clock gettime sys-
tem calls in the timer event scheduling code. Scone system
calls are optimized for raw throughput with a large number
of threads, but not for low latency; this makes the latency
measurement result 3× worse than the native execution. We
have considered the following latency optimizations:
• Reduced system call rate for immediately-scheduled
timer events. It removes one system call round-trip
from the packet latency.
• Modied scheduler that prioritizes immediately-sche-
duled events and allows to remove a system call from
scheduler if there are no periodic timer events.
One of the surprising results that we have is that each of
these optimizations does not have a statistically signicant
inuence when applied individually, which can be explained
by the fact that once the system call thread has le the back-
o mode, it will execute system calls with low individual
overhead. On the other hand, when applied simultaneously,
they return the latency to almost-native levels—inuence of
SGX and Scone on the latency is extremely small.
We consider using NIC timer as a separate optimization.
One can see that reading NIC timer is a costly operation;
it happens twice per packet in our measurements, adding
approximately 0.9∗2= 1.8µsec to the total latency. On the
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Figure 11: EtherMirror latencymeasurement
Phase Average Duration, µsec
Aestation 19467
CAS communication 19301
LAS communication 1474
Conguration 825.6
Total time 26368
Table 3: Overheads of conguration and attestation
other hand, it’s much faster than executing clock-reading sys-
tem calls, and can further improve system timeliness when
combined with other optimizations.
6.5 Conguration and Attestation
We next evaluate the overheads of the conguration and
aestation service in Slick. e measurement results are
presented in Table 3. e results show that remote aestation
has negligible eect on the Slick startup time. Furthermore,
even though TLS session establishment is a costly operation,
it is performed once per instance start-up, allowing operator
to use a single CAS node for thousands of Slick instances.
6.6 ToEnclave Overhead
Wenextmeasure the throughput of the new secure ToEnclave
element added in Slick, which is used to copy the packet
data inside SGX enclave protected memory. We evaluate the
impact of this extra data copy by measuring the throughput
scaling with varying packet size. Figure 12 and Figure 13
show the results for Wire and EtherMirror, respectively.
As we can see that the overhead of the extra memory copy
peaks with small packet sizes. is is due to the fact that for
each received packet, operations with rather high overhead
must be executed to allocate the packet. One way to reduce
this cost would be to batch the memory allocation for all
packets. It can be also seen that the overhead with Slick
when compared to the native execution is relatively small:
Slick with ToEnclave is running within 88% of the native
version with extra memory copy in the worst case of small
packet sizes, and within 60% of the native Click without
ToEnclave element.
6.7 NFVs Chaining
To measure the throughput of the NFV chaining scheme,
we have implemented a chaining application. e chain-
ing application implements packet communication between
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Figure 13: roughput w/ ToEnclave + EtherMirror
two Slick instances running on the same machine through a
DPDK packet ring. One instance contains an application that
receives packets from network and sends them to the other
instance via the DPDKRing element. e second instance re-
ceives packets from the ring and sends them back through
a dierent DPDKRing element. ese packets are received by
the rst Slick forming a circular ring. ereaer, the pack-
ets are transmied back to the load generating node. Please
note that the packets cross the rings twice. e chaining
application showcases the worst-case throughput since the
Click elements are not performing any computation on the
network packets.
Figure 14 presents the throughput with varying packet
size for the NFV chaining application. e results show that
using the ring communication causes a substantial perfor-
mance drop for Slick independent of the optimizations. is
is mostly related to the way Scone runs enclaves—it must
allocate constantly-running thread for the service threads
created by Slick andDPDK. Due to this, there is interference
between the service threads and processing cores, which de-
creases the throughput and also increases the result variance.
6.8 Packet Sealing Performance
We next evaluate the throughput of the Seal/Unseal secure
elements. In particular, we use our AES-GCM encryption
code running inside the SGX enclave (the same code is used
for middlebox state persistence code). Figure 15 presents
the throughput of the Seal element with varying packet
size. e result shows that the code inside SGX enclave runs
within 88% of the native performance irrespective of the op-
timizations applied. is is explained by the fact that most
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Figure 14: NFV chaining application throughput
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Figure 15: Seal application throughput
of the application CPU time is spent doing the encryption.
e dierence between the native and SGX version can be
explained by dierent thread scheduling strategies used by
Scone and native POSIX. In POSIX, threads are pinned to the
real CPU cores, while in Scone, the userspace threads inside
enclave are pinned to the in-enclave kernel threads. is
makes thread pinning non-deterministic—sometimes two
threads that are to be pinned to dierent cores are pinned
to sibling hyper-threads.
6.9 Case Studies
We next evaluate Slick’s performance with the following
two case-studies: (1) IPRouter, and (2) IDS.
IPRouter. IPRouter application is an adaptation of a multi-
port routerClick example application to our evaluation hard-
ware. is application rst classies all packets into three
categories: ARP requests, ARP replies, and all other packets.
ARP requests are answered. ARP replies are dropped. Other
packets are passed to a routing table element that sends
them to the NIC output port. Figure 16 shows the through-
put of the IPRouter application with varying packet size.
We can see that Slick has the same performance as Click
with packet sizes bigger than 256 bytes, and performs within
90% of Click with smaller packets.
We also measured the latency of the IPRouter applica-
tion as presented in Figure 17. We can see that even if the
number of elements in the application increases, latency of
the application remains the same as the native execution.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). IDS application imple-
ments NF that is commonly found in the enterprise network.
It pushes the trac through the rewall, and then performs
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Figure 16: IPRouter throughputmeasurements
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Figure 17: IPRouter latencymeasurements
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Figure 18: IDS throughputmeasurements
trac scanning with the HyperScan element. Trac that
does not match any paern is sent to the output, while match-
ing trac passes through a counter and then dropped.
Slick performs as close to the native Click execution
with a slight performance drop. is drop comes from the
general SGX overhead for memory accesses. Due to the space
constraints, we omit the latency measurement results for IDS.
7 RelatedWork
Sowaremiddleboxes. Click’s [23] modular architecture
has been leveraged in the research community to build many
useful soware-based middlebox platforms [10, 12, 19, 19, 27,
29]. Our work also builds on the Click architecture, but un-
like the previous work, Slick focuses on securing the Click
architecture on the untrusted commodity hardware.
However, most Click-based middleboxes operate at L2-L3
layer, with the notable exception of CliMB [26]. To sup-
port ow-based abstractions, many state-of-the-art middle-
boxes [8, 9, 17, 28, 28, 40] support comprehensive applica-
tions and use-cases. Since both Click and DPDK are geared
toward L2-L3 network processing, our current architecture
does not support L4-L7 network functions. As part of the
future work, we plan to integrate a high-performance user-
level networking stack [18] in the Scone framework to sup-
port the development of secure higher layer middleboxes.
Securemiddleboxes. APLOMB [42] is one the rst systems
to showcase that it is a viable alternative, performance- and
cost-wise, to outsourcemiddleboxes from the enterprise envi-
ronment to the cloud. However, APLOMB does not consider
the security implications of outsourcing in the cloud.
To overcome the limitation of APLOMB, the follow up
systems, namely Embark [25] and BlindBox [43], advocate
network data processing over the encrypted trac. In partic-
ular, BlindBox [43] proposes an encryption scheme based on
garbled circuits to support string matching operations over
encrypted trac. However, Blindbox supports only restric-
tive type of middlebox functionalities, such as NFs for deep
packet inspection. To overcome this limitation, Embark [25]
extends BlindBox to support a wider range of middlebox
functions. However, Embark suers from prohibitively low
performance as it involves complex cryptographic computa-
tions over the encrypted network trac. In contrast, Slick
supports a wide range of network functions (same as plain-
text), and achieves a near-native throughput and latency.
e recently published workshop papers [15, 22] have
elaborated the challenges and potential usages of SGX in the
network applications. In the domain of network-intensive
applications, SGX-Tor [21] is one of the rst systems to use
SGX to enhance the security and privacy of Tor. In a similar
vein, CBR [33] leverages SGX to support privacy-preserving
routing. Likewise, the Slick project builds the rst compre-
hensive system using Intel SGX to secure middleboxes.
Shielded execution. Shielded execution provides strong
security guarantees for legacy applications running on un-
trusted platforms [11, 24, 35, 38, 44, 46]. Our work leverages
shielded execution based on Intel SGX. It is worth noting
that unlike the prior usage of shielded execution for com-
monly used services like HTTP servers or KV stores, we
need to adapt the shielded execution to process the network
trac at line rates. To achieve this, Slick is the rst system
that integrates a high-speed packet I/O framework [2, 16, 34]
with shielded execution.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the design, implementation, and
evaluation of Slick—a secure middlebox framework for de-
ploying high-performance Network Functions (NFs) on un-
trusted commodity servers. Slick exposes a generic interface
based on Click to design and implement a wide-range of NFs
using its out-of-the box elements and C++ extensions. To
securely process data at line rate, Slick is the rst system to
integrate a high-performance I/O processing library (Intel
12
DPDK) with a shielded execution (Scone) framework based
on Intel SGX. We have also added several new useful fea-
tures, and optimizations for secure network processing. Our
evaluation using a wide-range of NFs and case-studies show
that Slick achieves near-native throughput and latency.
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